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ABSTRACT
Despite attempts to reform the law to eliminate hierarchies that subordinate
groups of people, the law usually ends up re-instantiating those hierarchies. This
“preservation through transformation” phenomenon occurs consistently, over time
and across legal disciplines. Karl Llewellyn’s efforts at drafting Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code are no different. Llewellyn attempted a paradigm shift in
contract formation when he sought to decouple contract law from its formalistic
roots and bring it back in touch with reality. But in so doing, the law-in-action strand
of Legal Realism ended up working at cross purposes with the other, critical strand
of Realism. As a result, Llewellyn’s paradigm shift only served to exacerbate struc-
tural problems built into the contract law system. This Essay attempts to explain why
Llewellyn’s efforts to reform contract law have had such serious long-term but unin-
tended consequences for the modern contract law system. It does so in an unorthodox
way. Instead of drawing from traditional contract-law scholarship, the Essay imports
insights from two seemingly unrelated fields—civil rights law and social philosophy.
The Essay’s central thesis is that revising existing doctrine will rarely if ever result in
meaningful change in the modern contract law system. In fact, doctrinal reform will
almost always be counter-productive, as reforms from within will only rebuild power,
advancing and further protecting the interests of the privileged. Understanding and
revealing this trap is essential to finding a path to lasting change. Contrary to tradi-
tional contract-law critiques, meaningful reform will only occur by understanding
power—who has it, why they have it, and how they keep it.
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INTRODUCTION
Contract law is full of unacknowledged contradictions that have real life
consequences. It purports, for example, to provide neutral and objective rules to
govern every aspect of a contract, from its making1 to its performance,2 to its
remedies in the event of breach.3 But instead of living up to its promise of
providing neutral rules, contract law continues to privilege and protect unequal
bargaining power, which in turn reinforces societal inequities and privileges
rather than reduces the coercion that exists in every contract.4 In a world of
dramatically expanding inequality,5 it seems more than appropriate to examine
contract law’s role in this reproduction of inequality.
Last century’s attempt at a paradigm shift in contract formation is embed-
ded in one strand of Legal Realism scholarship—a strand most often identified
with Karl Llewellyn and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.6 That
strand of legal realism, commonly referred to as the reformist or law-in-action
strand, sought to decouple contract law from its formalistic roots and bring it
back in touch with reality.7 But in so doing, the law-in-action strand of Legal
Realism ended up working at cross purposes with the other, critical strand of
Realism. As a practical consequence, Llewellyn’s paradigm shift in contract
law only served to intensify the structural problems built into the contract law
system.
This Essay takes a preliminary stab at explaining why Llewellyn’s efforts
to reform contract law have had such serious long-term but unintended conse-
quences for the modern contract law system. It does so in an unorthodox way.
Instead of drawing from traditional contract-law scholarship, the Essay imports
insights from two fields that at first blush seem distant: civil rights law and
social philosophy. The Essay’s central thesis is that tweaking existing doctrine
will never meaningfully change the modern contract law system. In fact, doctri-
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 9–16 (1979) (Formation of Con-
tracts—Parties and Capacity); id. §§ 17–70 (Formation of Contracts—Mutual Assent); id.
§§ 71–109 (Formation of Contracts—Consideration).
2 See, e.g., id. §§ 200–30 (The Scope of Contractual Obligations); id. §§ 231–60 (Perform-
ance and Non-Performance).
3 See, e.g., id. §§ 344–85 (Remedies).
4 See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions (forth-
coming) [hereinafter Hart, Reality] (on file with author).
5 See, e.g., Jared Bernstein et al., Pulling Apart: A State-by-State Analysis of Income
Trends, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/studies_
pulling_apart_2008/ (“[T]he incomes of the country’s richest families climbed substantially
over the past two decades, while middle- and lower-income families saw only modest
increases in income.”); Andrew Sum & Ishwar Khastiwada, Labor Underutilization
Problems of U.S. Workers Across Household Income Groups at the End of the Great Reces-
sion: A Truly Great Depression Among the Nation’s Low Income Workers Amidst Full
Employment Among the Most Affluent, CENTER FOR LAB. MARKET STUD. (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://iris.lib.neu.edu/clms_pub/26/, (lower income people disproportionately lost jobs and
are underemployed vis-a`-vis the more affluent); Timothy Noah, The Great Divergence,
SLATE MAG. (Sept. 16, 2010, 9:19PM), http://img.slate.com/media/3/100914_NoahT_Great
Divergence.pdf (1915—the richest 1% possessed 18% of the nation’s income; today, the
richest 1% account for 24% of the nation’s income).
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part I.
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nal reform will almost always be counterproductive, as reforms from within
will only rebuild power, advancing and further protecting the interests of the
privileged. Understanding and revealing this trap is essential to finding a path
to meaningful, lasting change.
The Essay has three parts. Part I sets the stage by summarizing the contri-
butions made by the Legal Realists and, in particular, Karl Llewellyn. Part II
then explores how Llewellyn’s project within Legal Realism has worked at
cross-purposes to the goals of other Legal Realists. Specifically, by pursuing
law in action, Llewellyn ultimately, although unintentionally, increased the
power embedded in contract law and exacerbated, rather than reduced, inequi-
ties. Drawing from leading scholarship in other fields, Part III reveals why the
law-in-action strand of Legal Realism was destined to fail and continues to fail.
The Essay concludes with some tentative thoughts on how to move forward.
A key point to underscore before continuing is that this Essay’s aim is not
to provide a comprehensive recipe for contract law reform. Such an ambitious
project is beyond the scope of an essay. But while perhaps less ambitious, the
Essay’s bottom line is equally important. It reveals an intrinsic failing in the
dominant approaches to contract law reform and seeks to spur scholarly discus-
sion on how to more meaningfully dismantle current inequities entrenched in
the law. Contrary to traditional contract law critiques, this Essay concludes that
meaningful reform will only occur by understanding power—who has it, why
they have it, and how they keep it.
I. LEGAL REALISM AND KARL LLEWELLYN
The story of Legal Realism of the 1920s and 1930s8 is still debated9 and
full of contradictions, both internal10 and external.11 This Essay does not
attempt to resolve these contradictions or to engage in the substantive debate
surrounding Legal Realism. That said, there seems to be no disagreement that
Karl Llewellyn was a Legal Realist.12 Consequently, a brief history of Legal
8 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169 (1992) (“[Legal Realism] usually refers to the body of legal
thought produced for the most part by law professors at Columbia and Yale Law Schools
during the 1920s and 1930s.”); BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 18, 87 (2007).
9 JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 1–2
(1995); see also HOROWITZ, supra note 8, at 170; LEITER, supra note 8.
10 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 208–09.
11 Compare NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (1995), and
HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 195–98 (situating Robert Hale squarely within Legal Realism),
with LEITER, supra note 8, at 18–19, 88 (arguing that Robert Hale was merely a marginal
figure within Realism). See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE
1927–1960 (1986) (legal realism as functionalism), Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 476–503 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra) [hereinafter
Singer, Realism] (disagreeing with Laura Kalman’s interpretation of Legal Realism); Brian
Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 731 (2009) (challenging
a conventional narrative about Legal Realism that credits the Realists “with bringing about a
revolutionary shift in views about judging in the American legal tradition”).
12 See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 68; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 169; KALMAN,
supra note 11, at 67; LEITER, supra note 8, at 61.
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Realism is necessary, if only to situate Llewellyn within it. This Essay therefore
offers the following as one, obviously simplified, version of the Realism story,
one that intentionally glosses over the contradictions.
Legal Realism of the 1920s and 1930s was not an intellectual move-
ment.13 It did not represent a distinctive methodology or embody a systematic
jurisprudence.14 Instead, Legal Realism, with its emphasis on social science,15
is probably best seen as a continuation of the sociological jurisprudence16 of
the pre-World War I Progressives,17 which directly challenged early twentieth
century classical legal thought.18 Notwithstanding this continuity, there are
enough differences to treat Legal Realism as a distinct intellectual outlook.19
And, regardless of approach, “[a]ll Realists shared one basic premise—that the
law had come to be out of touch with reality.”20
The attack on classical legal thought spawned contradictory responses
from Legal Realists.21 As a result of these contradictions, two strands of Legal
Realism emerged: one critical and one reformist.22
The critical strand of Legal Realism challenged classical legal thought’s
conceptions of law and legal reasoning,23 which drew sharp distinctions
between law and politics24 and portrayed law as an autonomous and self-exe-
13 Brian Leiter, for example, calls “American Legal Realism . . . the major intellectual event
in 20th century American legal practice and scholarship.” LEITER, supra note 8, at 1.  See
also DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 4, 68–69; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 26, 376 (1985).
14 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 64–65; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 169–70; SCHLEGEL, supra
note 9, at 8. But see KALMAN, supra note 11, at 3 (claiming the Realists developed a juris-
prudence); LEITER, supra note 8, at 61 (disputing the claim that Legal Realism cannot be
“defined”); Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1961)
(Llewellyn himself told Gilmore that Realism was a methodology).
15 See generally, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 8; KALMAN, supra note 11.
16 See DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 58 (discussing Pound’s sociological jurisprudence);
HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 189 (“Progressives treated social science research as providing a
necessary demystifying first step toward the goal of social reform. In short, social science
was another way of undermining disembodied formalism.”).
17 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 94–95; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209; G. Edward White,
From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early
Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1020 (1972).
18 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 9–10, 77; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 169, 171; EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROB-
LEM OF VALUE 79 (1973).
19 For example, the Progressive reformist agenda was court-centered, while Legal Realism
concentrated on statutory and administrative change. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 170.
20 Id. at 187; cf. KALMAN, supra note 11, at 9.
21 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting internal contradictions).
22 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209; cf., SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 7–8.
23 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining legal formalism, which conceived of law “as a
small body of formally interrelated fundamental doctrinal principles”); id. at 10–32; KAL-
MAN, supra note 11, at 3–4 (Realists challenged the conceptualism of Classical Legal
Thought, which was an attempt to “reduce law to a set of rules and principles” that “guided
judges to their decision.”); id. at 10–12; PURCELL, supra note 18, at 74–75; Elizabeth
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRES-
SIVE CRITIQUE 23, 32 (David Kairys ed., 3d. ed. 1998) [hereinafter Mensch, History].
24 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 170; SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 1; Mensch, History, supra
note 23, at 28–32; Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 478–79.
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cuting discourse.25 By systematically deconstructing the free market26 and
challenging the coherence of what was supposed to be purely private law in the
form of property27 and contract rights,28 the Realists were able to expose the
omnipresence of the state in the creation and distribution of rights and wealth in
society.29 In so doing, the Realists sought to debunk the claim of the older legal
orthodoxy that law was neutral, natural, and apolitical,30 and expose the politi-
cally conservative, status-quo-oriented nature of classical legal thought.31 The
critical strand of Legal Realism, therefore, was at least in part a critique of
power32—power that was embedded but concealed in law, in the ostensibly
free market, and in society in general.
The reformist strand of Legal Realism set out to determine the “law in
action;”33 that is, to figure out the way the law actually worked in society in
25 See DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 10–32; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 193; KALMAN, supra
note 11, at 10–12; PURCELL, supra note 18, at 74–75; SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 10;
Mensch, History, supra note 23, at 29–30, 33; Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 475–503.
26 See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) [hereinafter Hale, Coercion]; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,
Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943) [hereinafter Hale, Duress];
Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 482–96.
27 See generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1928
[hereinafter Cohen, Property]; Hale, Coercion, supra note 26; Singer, Realism, supra note
11, at 487–95. It is certainly debatable whether Morris Cohen can be called a Legal Realist.
See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 7. Morris Cohen, along with Robert Hale and others,
however, did mount devastating critiques against the Classical legal order. Grouping these
critical writers together under the heading of Legal Realism, therefore, where Legal Realism
is not seen as a jurisprudence or even a coherent movement, see supra text accompanying
notes 11–17, but rather as an “intellectual mood” seems entirely legitimate. See DUXBURY
supra note 11, at 4 (realism as an intellectual mood); HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 182–85;
SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 7–8; TWINING, supra note 13, at 3 (Realists are a “variously
defined aggregation of American jurists.”).
28 See generally Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933)
[hereinafter Cohen, Contract]; Hale, Coercion, supra note 26; Hale, Duress, supra note 26;
Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 482–87.
29 See generally Cohen, Contract, supra note 28; Cohen, Property, supra note 27; Hale,
Coercion, supra note 26; Hale, Duress, supra note 26; Robert L. Hale, Law Making by
Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451 (1920) [hereinafter Hale, Minorities];
Mensch, History, supra note 23, at 33–35; Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 482.
30 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 170; PURCELL, supra note 18, at 93 (“In attacking [the] tradi-
tional abstractions and nonempirical concepts of justice [of Classical Legal Thought, the
Realists] were usually assailing what they considered the practical injustices of American
society.”); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 187 (1988); Mensch, History, supra note 23, at 33–34.
31 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 25–32 (discussing nineteenth century court centered alle-
giance to a laissez-faire world view); HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 201; KALMAN, supra note
11, at 13 (“[T]he conceptualism behind [Langdell’s] case method bolstered the laissez-faire
economics of the age.”). But see Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 771–78 (contesting).
32 See Mensch, History, supra note 23, at 35; Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 475–503.
But see DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 7 (Critical Legal Studies viewed Legal Realism as
embodying a particular type of critique); LEITER, supra note 8, at 18–20, 88 (arguing that
this interpretation of the Realist critique is largely the invention of Critical Legal Studies).
33 See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910).
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terms of its impact on individuals and institutions.34 To bring the law back in
touch with reality, the Realists believed that the law needed to correctly mirror
social relations.35 To accomplish this task, the Realists adopted naturalism,36 a
methodology that required legal theorizing to be firmly situated and in line with
the empirical approach in the natural sciences.37 In conformity with this
approach,38 the Realists set out to develop and collect a series of social science
studies that would accurately describe social reality.39 Laws and institutions
could then be crafted that would better reflect and be better prepared to deal
with a more complex social reality.40 This undertaking was specifically non-
normative in nature.41 The “Is,” in other words, was consciously separated
from the “Ought.”42 The purpose of legal theory, therefore, was merely to iden-
tify and describe, not justify, the social reality that was uncovered.43
Karl Llewellyn is known as one of the most important figures in Legal
Realism, though this, too, is debated.44 Regardless of his actual place in the
34 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 95–96; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 210; KALMAN, supra note
11, at 9; cf. WHITE, supra note 17, at 1014.
35 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209.
36 PURCELL, supra note 18, at 3–12 (discussing scientific naturalism in American thought
generally); id. at 74–94 (discussing naturalism in the context of Legal Realism).
37 Cf. LEITER, supra note 8, at 30–31, 34; Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 458 (1924); Herman Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1924); Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and
the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 481 (1928). Kalman argues that the Realists’ juris-
prudence is most aptly called functionalism. KALMAN, supra note 11, at 3. There were,
however, dissenting voices and different approaches to addressing the law in action question.
See DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 80–81; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209; Morris R. Cohen,
Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 364–66 (1931); see also
TWINING, supra note 13, at 140 (contesting the claim that Llewellyn and the Realists “identi-
fied natural science with legal science”).
38 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 82 (arguing the Realist appeal to the natural sciences was not
an attempt to initiate lawyers in the ways of natural sciences, but rather was “an appeal for
lawyers to become familiar with the methods of the natural sciences specifically through the
methods of the social sciences”); KALMAN, supra note 11, at 20 (discussing the Realist
methodology).
39 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209–10; Mensch, History, supra note 23, at 33.
40 Leiter calls this aspect of the Legal Realist program, “pragmatism.” LEITER, supra note 8,
at 30–31, 52; see also HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209; Arthur F. McEvoy, A New Realism for
Legal Studies, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 433, 443 (2005).
41 LEITER, supra note 8, at 63. But see KALMAN, supra note 11, at 32 (most realists were
reformers); PURCELL, supra note 18, at 90–92 (noting Morris Cohen was very much a critic
of the Realist ethical relativism).
42 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 210 (noting that Llewellyn intended the separation of the “Is”
from the “Ought” to be temporary); PURCELL, supra note 18, at 82, 85; TWINING, supra note
13, at 140 (claiming Llewellyn was not indifferent to values).
43 Cf. LEITER, supra note 8, at 63.
44 Compare PURCELL, supra note 18, at 80 (Llewellyn was “often regarded as the most
important of the new critics.”); TWINING, supra note 13, at 82 (naming Llewellyn as one of
two leading Realists); id. at 367 (Llewellyn was the realist movement’s “most sophisticated
jurist, and a central figure in its most important controversy.”), and Zipporah Batshaw Wise-
man, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465,
466 (1987) (Llewellyn was a central figure), with HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 171 (calling it
ironic that Llewellyn came to be known as the “undisputed guru of Realism,” given Llewel-
lyn’s inexperience and lack of jurisprudential work at the time he “defined” Legal Realism);
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historiography, it seems undisputable that Llewellyn pursued the law in action
or reformist strand of Legal Realism.45 Nowhere is this better reflected than in
Llewellyn’s own writings.46 A couple of examples will have to suffice to estab-
lish this point. In the conclusion to A Realistic Jurisprudence, for instance,
Llewellyn argued that the “focus of study . . . for all things legal has been
shifting,” such that a “clearer visualization of the problems involved moves
toward ever-decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-increasing emphasis on
observable behavior.”47 Then, in Some Realism About Realism, Llewellyn
remonstrated that, “no judgment of what Ought to be done in the future with
respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without knowing objec-
tively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now doing.”48 Tellingly,
Llewellyn went on to state that, “‘[l]aw’ without effect approaches zero in its
meaning. To be ignorant of its effect is to be ignorant of its meaning. To know
its effect without study of the persons whom it affects is impossible.”49
To situate Karl Llewellyn within Legal Realism, therefore, seems rela-
tively straightforward. To pin down Llewellyn’s contribution(s) to American
jurisprudence in general or to Legal Realism in particular, however, is beyond
the scope of this Essay. Others are much more qualified to undertake that
task.50 It is sufficient for the purposes of this Essay to note that the Uniform
Commercial Code has been called “the flower of the legal realist movement in
SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 6 (Llewellyn was on the margins of Legal Realism), and
Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 736.
45 See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 51 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); Wiseman,
supra note 44, at 470–71, 493; John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of
Llewellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 305–06 (2000); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 623–24 (1975);
Frederick Schauer, Editor’s Introduction, in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 1,
5–6 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011).
46 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 431 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Jurisprudence]; Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Real-
ism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Realism]; Karl N. Llewellyn, One “Realist’s” View of Natural Law for Judges,
15 NOTRE DAME LAW. 3 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Natural Law]; Karl N. Llewellyn,
Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779 (1939) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Offer]; Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Contract].
47 Llewellyn, Jurisprudence, supra note 46, at 464.
48 Llewellyn, Realism, supra note 46, at 1236–37.
49 Id. at 1249; see also Llewellyn, Contract, supra note 46, at 705 (posing and attempting to
answer the broad question of “the role of contract in the social order, the part that contract
plays in the life of men”); Llewellyn, Natural Law, supra note 46, at 6 (“Guidance for a
particular society must plant its feet in that society. And guidance for a positive legal scheme
must rub elbows with that scheme, or grow chimerical.”). In Llewellyn, Offer, supra note 46,
Llewellyn’s main argument is that the dichotomy drawn between bilateral and unilateral
contracts under traditional (or orthodox) contract law was completely meaningless when
factually tested in the context of business bargains. See also Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kon-
tract Principles and Karl’s New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commer-
cial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 227 (1966) (reiterating the thesis of Llewellyn, Offer, supra
note 46).
50 See generally TWINING, supra note 13; Breen, supra note 45; Gilmore, supra note 14;
Wiseman, supra note 44.
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American law,”51 and Karl Llewellyn, as the Chief Reporter52 of the UCC, was
its “principal architect.”53 Notwithstanding his contribution to the UCC project
as a whole, Llewellyn is probably most well-known for drafting Article 2 (cov-
ering the sale of goods).54 Llewellyn’s pursuit of the law in action is stamped
all over this part of the Code.55 Unfortunately, in pursuing the law in action,
Llewellyn ultimately worked at cross-purposes with the critical strand of Legal
Realism, and this produced (and continues to produce) serious but unintended
consequences.
II. CROSS PURPOSES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Karl Llewellyn was extremely critical of the orthodox conception of con-
tract law that was premised on what he considered an archaic formation struc-
ture consisting of offer, acceptance, and consideration.56 To Llewellyn, this
model was unrealistic because it did not actually function well and did not
comport with reality.57 He therefore attempted a paradigm shift away from the
idea of a promise as the basis of contractual obligation in favor of the parties’
agreement in fact.58 He did so in a specific attempt to substitute a more
dynamic agreement construct, one that was transaction-oriented, for the old,
51 Mooney, supra 49, at 254; see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal
Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used To Be”, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 370 (2005); Greg-
ory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 71 U COLO. L REV. 541, 542–44 (2000).
52 See TWINING, supra note 13, at 283 (describing the role of the Chief Reporter, in gen-
eral); id. at 284, 300, 339–40.
53 Id. at 367; accord Mooney, supra note 49, at 223; see also Breen, supra note 45, at
267–68; Danzig, supra note 45, at 621–22; Gilmore, supra note 14, at 814; Maggs, supra
note 51, at 541; Wiseman, supra note 44, at 467.
54 Breen, supra note 45, at 268; Danzig, supra note 45, at 621–22; Ingrid Michelsen Hil-
linger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, the
True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1146 (1984); Mooney, supra
note 49, at 223; Wiseman, supra note 44, at 468. Llewellyn was also the principal drafter of
Article One of the Code (General Provisions). Mooney, supra note 49, at 223; Wiseman,
supra note 44, at 467.
55 See infra Part II; Wiseman, supra note 44, at 493–94, 504, 509–19 (discussing 3 specific
merchant rules); cf. Danzig, supra note 45, at 628, 631.
56 Mooney, supra note 49, at 218, 230.
57 Id. at 218, 221–22.
58 Id. at 222, 224, 227; TWINING, supra note 13, at 339; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1–2, at 28–29 (5th ed. 2000); Breen, supra note
45, at 270, 319–22. Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to all other Articles
of the UCC. See U.C.C. §1-201(11) (2010) (a contract is defined as, “the total legal obliga-
tion which results from the parties’ agreement”); id. §1-201(3) (an agreement is defined as,
“the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other
circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as
provided in this Act (Sections 1-205, 2-208, and 2A-207).”); id. § 1-205(1) (course of deal-
ing); id. § 1-205(2) (usage of trade); id. §2-208(1) (current version at U.C.C. § 3-303
(2010)) (course of performance), id. §1-303 (revised—containing definitions for course of
dealing, usage of trade, course of performance); see also BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J.
WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 306–07 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing UCC §2-202(a)
and its significance in undermining the “contract/no contract dichotomy” by expanding what
constitutes “the contract,” by including trade usage, course of dealing, and course of
performance).
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static model of formation premised on offer, acceptance, and consideration.59
To Llewellyn, his new construct represented the law in action—it was func-
tional and represented the way businesses actually conducted business.60 And
by “business,” Llewellyn meant “merchants.” Llewellyn, in other words,
drafted Article 2 to reflect mercantile customs and practices.61
Under Llewellyn’s agreement-in-fact construct, therefore, formation of a
contract was (and is) made much easier.62 For example, under Article 2, con-
tracts can be formed by conduct63 and not just through an exchange of commu-
nications that constitute an offer followed by an acceptance.64 In addition, a
contract can be formed even though the exact moment of mutual assent cannot
be identified,65 and even if material terms are missing,66 provided that the par-
ties intended to make a contract and an appropriate remedy can be crafted.67
The Code’s rules regarding acceptance are also relaxed, thus making it easier to
conclude that acceptance occurred,68 and, hence, a contract was formed.69 As
for consideration, it is not even required for a valid contract in certain
instances.70
At the same time, Llewellyn also introduced two concepts that were new
to contract law: good faith71 and unconscionability.72 Together, these doctrines
59 Mooney, supra note 49, at 220–21.
60 But see TWINING, supra note 13, at 313–14 (noting that no systematic empirical research
was conducted for the UCC drafting project); Hillinger, supra note 54, at 1146–62 (arguing
that Llewellyn made up the merchant rules in Article 2 and discussing specifics).
61 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 211; Mooney, supra note 49, at 220; Wiseman, supra note 44,
at 471–72, 491–93. But also note the radical change Llewellyn envisioned with his merchant
rules never came about. See Hillinger, supra note 54, at 1146–62 (arguing that Article 2 was
not premised on actual business practice).
62 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 58, § 1-2, at 4; see also Danielle Kie Hart, Contract
Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 202–04 (2009) [here-
inafter Hart, Formation].
63 U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2010); see also id. §§ 2-206(1) & 2-207(3).
64 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 58, § 1–2, at 4.
65 U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
66 Id. §§ 2-305 (open price term), 2-307 (parties have not specified whether delivery and
payment are to be made in lots), 2-308 (place for delivery not specified), 2-309 (time for
delivery not specified).
67 Id. § 2-204(3).
68 Under § 2-206(1), for example, unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the offeror,
offers are “construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances.” Id. § 2-206(1). Moreover, acceptance can be made either by shipment or
promise by the offeree, and simply by beginning performance with notice to the offeror of
such. See id. § 2-206(1)(b) & (2), respectively. Even acceptances that vary the terms of the
offer will operate as an acceptance, unless the offeree explicitly states that its acceptance is
conditional on the offeror’s assent. See id. § 2-207(i); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 58, § 1-2, at 5.
69 Mooney, supra note 49, at 235.
70 See U.C.C. §§ 2-205 (firm offers require no consideration to be binding for up to 3
months), 2-209(1) (modifications are binding without consideration).
71 See id. §§ 1-201(19) (general standard of good faith) & 2-103(1)(j) (good faith standard
for merchants); see also Mooney, supra note 49, at 222, 245–46.
72 U.C.C. § 2-302; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 n.11 (1967) (noting that Llewellyn was
the principal draftsman of Article 2).
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incorporated norms of fairness and cooperation into contract law73 and ostensi-
bly worked to benefit the weaker contracting party by circumscribing the types
of terms that would theoretically get enforced74 and the behavior of the con-
tracting partners in the performance and enforcement of their contract.75
Where Llewellyn may have gotten his ideas for Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code may be open to question,76 but one thing is clear: By making
formation easier, Llewellyn ended up increasing and further entrenching the
power embedded in contract law—power that according to the critical strand of
Legal Realism, takes the form of state-sponsored coercion.77
According to the “critical” Realists,78 coercion is ubiquitous in con-
tracting. In fact, coercion is “at the heart of every bargain.”79 This is because
every party is entitled by law to withhold from his contracting partner every-
thing that he owns, whether it be his land, labor, capital, money, etc.80 “Coer-
cion, therefore, is a function of ownership.”81 Ownership, in turn, is determined
by the state, because ownership is very much “a function of legal entitle-
ments[;] it was and is the state that creates and protects property rights.”82 It
follows that the more one party owns, the stronger that party’s threat to with-
hold what he owns becomes.83 Coercion therefore exists every time a party
decides to enter into a contract “to avoid the consequences with which the other
[party] threatens him.”84 Thus, because every contract involves mutual threats
to withhold—for example, where one party says “pay me what I am asking, or I
will withhold my goods” and the other party responds “give me your goods, or
I will withhold my money,”—every contract is the product of state-sponsored
coercion.85
In the context of contract formation, the amount a party owns determines
that party’s bargaining power or capacity to coerce.86 The more coercive capac-
73 See Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 193; cf. Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract
Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 23, at 497; Charles L. Knapp, Com-
mentary, An Offer You Can’t Revoke, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 309, 318; Wiseman, supra note 44,
at 506.
74 See U.C.C. § 2-302.
75 See id. §§ 1-201(19) & 2-103(1)(b); see also Mooney, supra note 49, at 247–51; cf.
Hillinger, supra note 54, at 1147, 1163.
76 Compare, e.g., Hillinger, supra note 54, at 1146–62 with TWINING, supra note 13, at
313–21.
77 I have mapped out the Realists’ coercion argument in detail elsewhere. See generally
Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 29–33.
78 See supra notes 23–32 (discussing the critical strand of Legal Realism).
79 Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764 (1981)
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT) [hereinafter
Mensch, Ideology].
80 See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 27; Hale, Coercion, supra note 26; Mensch,
Ideology, supra note 79, at 764; Singer, Realism, supra note 11, at 486.
81 Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 29 (footnote omitted).
82 Id.
83 Cohen, Property, supra note 27, at 11–13; Hale, Coercion, supra note 26, at 471–73;
Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 627; Mensch, Ideology, supra note 79, at 764; Singer, Real-
ism, supra note 11, at 486.
84 Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 29 (footnote omitted).
85 See generally id.
86 See Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 627–28; see also Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 29.
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ity/bargaining power a party has the more that party gets to dictate the terms of
the contract. A party’s coercive capacity does not in and of itself pose a prob-
lem. But this capacity is coupled with two structural features of the modern
contract law system that make it extremely difficult for the weaker party to
effectively challenge whether a contract was formed at all. First, regardless of
ideology, all the competing tests for mutual assent (i.e., the doctrine by which
the individual agreement of the parties is tested) make it very easy to establish
mutual assent in practice;87 and, as a general rule, consideration is usually pre-
sent in market-based transactions.88 Second, a presumption of contract validity
springs into existence at the moment a contract is formed via mutual assent and
consideration.89
This presumption of contract validity is extremely difficult to rebut in
practice because of what I have referred to elsewhere as the “process problem”
in contract law.90 To begin with, the process problem imposes the burden on
the party challenging the contract or defending a breach of contract action to
show that the contract is unenforceable.91 Moreover, all the other contract doc-
trines one might use to either challenge or defend against the contract (includ-
ing but not limited to contract interpretation and defenses to performance)
presume that a valid contract has already been formed.92 In addition, several
practical realities exist, such as the costs of litigation, the ubiquity of certain
contract boilerplate clauses (i.e., merger, arbitration, choice of law, choice of
forum clauses), and the fact that courts are reluctant to allow parties out of their
contracts, regardless of the legal excuse raised.93 All of this together means that
a successful rebuttal of the presumption of contract validity is highly unlikely
in practice.94
Thus, as a direct result of the presumption of contract validity, a contract
formed via Article 2’s formation rules will usually be binding and all of its
terms, including any unreasonable ones, will most likely be enforceable in
court.95 Significantly, the difficulty of disproving the presumption of contract
validity may well give license, if not perverse incentive, to the party with
greater coercive capacity to impose more onerous terms during contract forma-
tion.96 The result, even if such incentives are not capitalized on,97 is to increase
87 See Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 204–10.
88 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 48 (4th ed. 2004); Charles L. Knapp,
Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1195 (1998).
89 See generally Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 206–15; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at
11.
90 See Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 210–15; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 11–12.
91 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 206; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 12.
92 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 200–02; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 12.
93 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 212–14; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 12–13.
94 See generally Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 200–02, 210–16; Hart, Reality, supra
note 4, at 11–13 (citations omitted).
95 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 215; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 13.
96 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 216; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 57.
97 Regardless of whether the incentive to impose more onerous terms is capitalized on or
not, the party with more coercive capacity/bargaining power will get to dictate the terms of
the contract. Coercive capacity/bargaining power will be increased with each contract the
stronger party enters into because the stronger party is able to reap more from each contract
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the coercive capacity of the stronger contracting party.98 This is because the
stronger party will not only be able to reap more gains (in terms of money,
land, capital, etc.) through each contract it enters into, but the presumption of
contract validity will also enable that party to retain those gains.99 Recall that
the amount one owns determines one’s bargaining power/coercive capacity. It
thus becomes a vicious circle: the more a party owns, the more bargaining
power/coercive capacity that party has; the more that party gets to dictate con-
tract terms, the more property that party gets to acquire; and so on.100 In the
end, the coercion present in contract law is increased and entrenched. More
than that, the coercion that exists is concealed, because satisfying Article 2’s
formation rules provides a veneer of voluntariness.101 A contract is by common
understanding an act of free will (autonomy); after all, one must “agree” to be
bound.102 Hence, there is (usually) no coercion in contracting.103 Or so the
argument goes.
In short, by pursuing the law in action in Article 2, specifically, by making
it easier to form a contract, Llewellyn ended up increasing, further entrenching,
and concealing the coercion present in contract law. In so doing, he worked at
cross-purposes with and arguably even undermined the other critical strand of
Legal Realism that exposed and critiqued power.104 This result is not surprising
and, in fact, is to be expected.
III. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
A. “Preservation Through Transformation”
By changing contract law’s formation rules, Llewellyn ended up increas-
ing the coercion present in contract law. This result is to be expected because
this is what the law does. That is, regardless of any attempts to bring about
change, the law tends to evolve in such a way as to preserve and privilege
than it otherwise could with less coercive capacity/bargaining power. See Hart, Reality,
supra note 4, at 52.
98 Id. at 52, 57.
99 Id. at 52.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 57.
102 Id.
103
“Usually” is the operative word here because contract law does recognize that coercion
sometimes does come into play, and it takes steps to address coercion in those delimited
situations. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164 (1981) (misrepresenta-
tion), 175 (duress), 208 (unconscionability). It is important to keep in mind, however, that
these steps are largely ineffective. See generally Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at
198–218.
104 Professor Morton Horwitz also concludes that the reformist strand of Legal Realism
ended up suppressing the critical strand. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 210. Professor Horwitz’s
theory of why the constructive strand of Realism not only failed but also worked against the
critical strand centers on the willingness of the reformers to separate the Is from the Ought,
that is, on their willingness to avoid having to determine values. Id. at 210–11. This explana-
tion is very persuasive, but is different from the arguments made in this Essay. See infra Part
III.B.
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established hierarchies. Two ground-breaking articles, one by Reva Siegel and
the other by Cheryl Harris, illustrate this phenomenon.105
In ‘The Rule of Love’: Wife Beating as Prerogative,106 Reva Siegel docu-
ments the evolution of the law governing marital violence (or wife beating)
from the days when husbands possessed a “chastisement prerogative,” to the
enactment of the Violence Against Women Act.107 Notwithstanding consistent
efforts to reform the law to better protect women,108 violence against women
within their own households continues to persist in staggering numbers.109 In
“Whiteness As Property,”110 Cheryl Harris traces the transformation of the con-
cept of “whiteness” from a description of skin color used merely as a way to
distinguish white indentured or bond servants from captured Africans who were
sold in the Americas,111 to a property right with legal and social value and
consequences.112
It is not possible to do justice to either of these articles in the short space
that this Essay will devote to them. But collectively, both articles tell a very
similar story, and it is this collective story that has resonances for contract law.
That story goes like this:
Despite periodic success, the law governing marital violence and race
evolved in such a way as to reflect and perpetuate racial, gender, and class
hierarchies such that heterosexual white men, usually but not necessarily lim-
ited to the middle and upper classes, were privileged and their interests pro-
tected by law. For example, by the 1870s, a husband’s prerogative to physically
chastise his wife113 was unequivocally repudiated by the courts.114 Violence in
marriage, however, continued to exist.115 The law’s response to the ongoing
violence was hostile to any remedy “that might assist wives in separating from
105 Even though this Essay focuses on the Siegel and Harris articles, it is important to
acknowledge that they were certainly not the first to critique power and its role in both the
social construction and oppression of race, gender, identity, etc. See, e.g., Patricia J. Wil-
liams, On Being the Object of Property, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 216, 223
(1991); CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
12–13 (1987); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880
(1990); Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
106 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
107 Id. at 2121–2200 (chronicling the transformation of marital violence law over time).
108 These reform efforts included the antebellum temperance movement and the women’s
rights movement—both the original and contemporary. Id. at 2127.
109 Id. at 2172–73 (using statistics from 1995 to show persistence in violence against
women).
110 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
111 Id. at 1709.
112 See generally id. at 1715–77 (documenting in detail the way in which whiteness was
constructed as a property right from slavery through the 1986 case of Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 467 U.S. 267 (1986)). According to Harris, “[t]he law’s construction of whiteness
defined and affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); of privilege (what benefits
accrue to that status); and, of property (what legal entitlements arise from that status).” Id. at
1725.
113 Siegel, supra note 106, at 2122–23.
114 Id. at 2129.
115 Id. at 2130.
Fall 2011] CROSS PURPOSES & UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 67
their husbands”116 because nineteenth-century judges assumed “that a wife was
obliged to endure various kinds of violence as a normal—and sometimes
deserved—part of married life.”117 These same judges also assumed that a cer-
tain amount of violence was an accepted fact of life for the married poor.118
Some marital violence was subject to criminal prosecution,119 but those prose-
cutions were usually limited to African-American men120 and members of the
“vicious [and dangerous] classes,”121 i.e., the poor, who beat their wives.122
Middle and upper class white men were rarely if ever prosecuted, and, in fact,
were granted various legal immunities, both criminal and civil,123 for wife beat-
ing in the name of “affective privacy.”124
This privileging of heterosexual white men translated into the unequal dis-
tribution of social and material benefits and goods.125 Ownership of property,
for example, was originally limited to white men.126 In addition to social stand-
ing,127 public reputation,128 and the “‘public and psychological wage’” of
being white,129 white identity also “conferred tangible and economically valua-
ble benefits”130 because property was and is broadly construed to include “all
of those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important for
116 Id. at 2132.
117 Id. at 2133–34.
118 Id. at 2134.
119 Several states adopted public flogging as the punishment for wife beating. Id. at 2137.
120 Id. at 2136, 2138–40.
121 Id. at 2138–39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122 See id.
123 Id. at 2154–61 (discussing criminal immunity), 2161–70 (discussing inter-spousal tort
immunity).
124
“Affective privacy” is the rhetoric that replaced authority-based conceptions of mar-
riage, which had been used to justify giving husbands the prerogative to physically chastise
their wives. Id. at 2151–53. Affective privacy embodied the ideas of companionate marriage,
(i.e., the belief that wives were companions to their husbands and not their servants, and
therefore, ties of affection and “disinterested love,” not authority, linked household mem-
bers), and marital privacy (i.e., the belief that to protect the sanctity of marriage, what hap-
pens between a husband and wife should be shielded from public scrutiny). Id. at 2143–44,
2147, 2151–53.
125 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 110, at 1741.
126 See id. at 1715–24 (discussing the racialized nature of property in general), 1718 (noting
that Blacks were not permitted to own property), 1718–21 (discussing fusion of race eco-
nomic domination through slavery), 1721–24 (showing only white claims to property owner-
ship were recognized via conquest); see also Siegel, supra note 106, at 2122 (discussing
how a husband acquired rights to most of his wife’s property upon marriage).
127 Harris, supra note 110, at 1737.
128 Id. at 1734–36, 1746–50 (discussing Homer A. Plessy’s reputation claim in the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
129 Id. at 1741 (quoting W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 700 (1976)). These
wages that were accorded to white identity included public deference, being “‘admitted
freely with all classes of white people, to public functions . . . . The police were drawn from
their ranks . . . . Their vote selected public officials [which] . . . had great effect on their
personal treatment.’” Id. at 1741–42 (quoting W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION
700–01 (1976)).
130 Id. at 1726; see also Siegel, supra note 106, at 2154–61, 2161–70 (discussing criminal
immunity and inter-spousal tort immunity for wife beating).
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human well-being, including: freedom of expression, . . . and free and equal
opportunity to use personal faculties.”131
But more than this, heterosexual white male privilege (material and
social), together with its status on top of the hierarchy, were normalized such
that the category and its privileges became the baseline, the quintessential
objective, neutral, apolitical, and unquestioned norm.132 A mechanism was then
used that enabled the legal system to mask, or at least divert attention away
from, the hierarchy with its attendant and unequal privileges. For Harris, this
mechanism is her ingenious “whiteness” construct,133 and for Siegel it is the
use of ostensibly neutral legal language that reflects neither gender, nor class,
nor race.134 “Whiteness,” for example, not only ameliorated class hierarchies
but also enabled the class exploitation present in labor markets to be evaded.135
This is because whiteness enabled white workers to “accept their lower class
position in the hierarchy ‘by fashioning identities as ‘not slaves’ and as ‘not
Blacks.’’”136
What changes from one period to another in the evolution of the law is
simply the rhetoric and legal strategies or doctrines used to legitimate the new
hierarchical regimes. A husband’s right to physically chastise his wife,137 for
instance, was replaced by criminal and tort immunities for wife beating;138 and
the legal rhetoric changed from justifications that were authority-based and
explicitly hierarchical139 to the language of companionate marriage140 and
affective privacy.141 In each instance, however, the hierarchies (men over
women, rich men over poor men, white men over Black men) and a husband’s
prerogative to physically chastise his wife remained intact.142
Harris paints the same picture in the context of race. She argues, for exam-
ple, that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in Brown v. Board of Education143 simply modified its earlier
interpretation of that Clause in Plessy v. Ferguson144 and thus “accommodated
both Blacks’ claims for ‘equality under the law’ and the global interests of
131 Harris, supra note 110, at 1726 (quoting Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay,
100 YALE L.J. 127, 128–29 (1990)). White identity also “determined whether one could
vote, travel freely, attend schools, obtain work, and indeed, defined the structure of social
relations along the entire spectrum of interactions between the individual and society.” Id. at
1745.
132 See, e.g., id. at 1730, 1738, 1746, 1753; Siegel, supra note 106, at 2157, 2158.
133 Harris, supra note 110, at 1730.
134 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 106, at 2157, 2158.
135 Harris, supra note 110, at 1742.
136 Id. (quoting DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 13 (1991)).
137 Siegel, supra note 106, at 2123–24.
138 Id. at 2154–61 (discussing criminal immunity), 2161–70 (discussing inter-spousal tort
immunity).
139 Id. at 2122–23.
140 Id. at 2142–44, 2146–48; see also supra note 124 (discussing companionate marriage
and affective privacy).
141 Siegel, supra note 100, at 2151–53; see also supra note 124.
142 See supra notes 107–17.
143 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
144 Plessy v. Ferguson, 168 U.S. 537 (1896).
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white ruling elites.”145 What ended up changing was some of society’s formal
rules. But, “[w]hat remained consistent was the perpetuation of institutional
privilege under a standard of legal equality . . . . What remained in revised and
reconstituted form was whiteness as property.”146
Some might argue that the collective story told by Siegel and Harris is
about status law (gender, race, class) and is a public law (civil rights) story to
boot, while contract law is private law, does not implicate a status category, and
has nothing whatsoever to do with civil rights. But this argument would be
wrong.147 Although it is true that contract law and civil rights are rarely if ever
discussed together, contract law does implicate a status category. Specifically,
contract law is very much intertwined with class. Viewed from this perspective,
the collective story told by Siegel and Harris is also the story of contract law.
Class hierarchy is intimately connected to contract law by virtue of the
fact that pre-existing and unequal distributions of property (land, capital,
resources, etc.) are taken as a given and never questioned,148 as if such unequal
distributions are natural, apolitical rights that are sorted out by individuals com-
peting in a free market. In reality, property rights are state conferred rights that
are literally premised on racial and gender subordination.149 Recall that prop-
erty ownership was originally limited to white men.150 Consequently, the state
did not distribute property rights equally from the very beginning.151 This une-
qual distribution is thus perpetuated and exacerbated over time because one’s
property rights determine one’s bargaining power in the market, and hence
what and how much one will ultimately be able to acquire.152
And, like the collective story of gender and race hierarchy Siegel and Har-
ris detail, contract law also evolved (and continues to evolve) in such a way as
to reflect and maintain class hierarchy. The only things that change during the
evolution of contract law are the rhetoric and legal doctrines used to legitimate
the hierarchical regime.
145 Harris, supra note 110, at 1757.
146 Id.
147 I have argued elsewhere that contract law is public not private and will not devote any
time to this argument in this Essay. See Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 33–34; see also
Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law in Context (forthcoming) (on file with author) (arguing that
contracts and contract law have everything to do with civil rights and equality).
148 See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 27 (exposing the role of the state in creating
property rights and the consequences that directly flow from that, namely, the delegation of
power by the state to owners to compel fellow human beings to do what the owners want,
which ultimately leads to the unequal distribution of material benefits); Hale, Duress, supra
note 26, at 603–04 (exposing the unquestioned nature and existence of ownership of prop-
erty (land, labor, etc.) and its relationship to coercion).
149 See Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 34–35, 55–57 (discussing the state’s role in property
rights and contracts); Harris, supra note 110, passim (documenting how whiteness was con-
structed by the state as a property right).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 112, 126, & 131.
151 Nor are all state-conferred property rights equal—some people are endowed with more
advantageous rights than others. See Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 627–28.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 97, 112, & 131; see also Hale, Duress, supra note
26, at 627–28 (“It is with these unequal rights that men bargain and exert pressure on one
another. These rights give birth to the unequal fruits of bargaining.”); Hart, Reality, supra
note 4, at 33–35, 54.
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Contract law rhetoric went from the bucolic images of the nineteenth cen-
tury’s arm’s length, face-to-face transaction to trade a horse,153 for example, to
Llewellyn’s savvy merchant seller or buyer who was wise to the ways of the
twentieth century market.154 These changes in contract law rhetoric were prob-
ably prompted by the dramatic social and economic transformation of Ameri-
can society, including, but certainly not limited to, the increasingly greater
concentration of capital among a smaller number of companies vis-a`-vis the
rights of workers who attempted to organize “in response to their collective
dependence on these emerging monopolies . . . , exploitation of the Third
World, [and] advancing technology.”155
The classical rules of contract law simply did not reflect the power dispari-
ties that were part and parcel of everyday life.156 Legal doctrine thus shifted
from the static offer-acceptance-consideration construct of the nineteenth cen-
tury157 to Lewellyn’s transaction-oriented agreement-in-fact construct, which
was cabined by good faith and unconscionability to help ensure its fairness in
operation.158 This change in formation structure did (and does) produce some
positive individual results, but not that often.159 Because the shift in contract
doctrine did not produce a systemic remedy160 and the pre-existing and unequal
distribution of property was not tampered with, let alone questioned by the new
formation structure and doctrines, the existing class hierarchy with its attendant
privileges and power was and is preserved.
The mechanism used in the contract law context to conceal the class hier-
archy that contract law helps to maintain is the “free” market.161 In the ostensi-
bly “free” market, the baseline from which everyone starts is never discussed
but is nevertheless premised on pre-existing and unequal distributions of prop-
153 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law 1 (Univ.
of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 415, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1162922http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1162922; Wiseman, supra note 44, at 475.
154 Wiseman, supra note 44, at 475.
155 Gabel & Feinman, supra note 73, at 504.
156 Cf. Wiseman, supra note 44, at 476.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 56–59.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 71–75.
159 See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2006) (“Data revealed
that in only 37.8% (56 out of 148) of the cases sampled unconscionability was found . . . .”);
Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L.
REV. 443, 463–65 (2005) (An examination of published state cases of duress from 1996
through 2003 found that in “only nine of the eighty-eight [duress] cases did the court decide
the matter in favor of the duress claim.” Of those nine cases, an appellate court affirmed a
lower court’s finding of duress in only two cases.); see also text accompanying notes 97–103
(discussing the presumption of contract validity and the process problem associated with it);
Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 198–202 (explaining in detail why contract policing
doctrines like unconscionability do not work very effectively).
160 Good faith and unconscionability, for example, confer individual claims that, if success-
ful, would give that contracting party individual relief. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203, cmt.
(2004) (good faith and breach of contract claim) & 2-302 (unconscionability).
161 See supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the critical strand of Legal Realism).
I have argued elsewhere that the market is not “free.” See Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at
29–32.
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erty.162 Despite the fact that people do not start from the same baseline, the
assumption is that the free market will be the great equalizer.163 That is, every-
one has the same chance to succeed because all it takes to succeed in a free
market is individual merit.164 And because success is made an entirely individ-
ual endeavor under market mythology, so is failure.165 Consequently, if you
have not succeeded in the market, something is wrong with you, not with the
market in particular or society in general.
Notwithstanding the realities of the market, including the unequal base-
lines from which people start, the mystical but cherished belief is that, in the
free market, anyone can acquire as much as anyone else and, hence, everyone
can be equal. Of course, this belief is not true, given everyone’s vastly different
starting positions; and it only makes sense “in a society [like ours] that defines
individualism as the highest good, and the ‘market value’ of the individual as
the just and true assessment.”166
Nevertheless, and as a result, everyone has a stake in maintaining the ide-
ology of the free market as a way to separate me from you and “us” from
“them.” In other words, acknowledging that the free market is a myth and that
the normalized baseline is anything but equal threatens self- and group-identity,
the very personal understanding that I am better than you and “we” are better
than “them” because I/we have done better than you/them in the market. To
acknowledge that the market is not free and the baseline is not equal would
expose the class hierarchy present in American society and also force everyone
to confront the very real possibility that, absent the unequal distribution of
property, that is, if I/we started from the same place as you/them, I/we might be
no better than you/them. Worse still, I/we could be worse off (i.e., lower) than
you/them in the hierarchy.167 Hence, the myth of the free market persists and
provides a powerful tool that not only reinforces the classical liberal trope of
individual merit but also masks the class hierarchy that exists in society at large
and contract law’s role in helping to maintain it.168
Thus, the story of contract law is very similar to the collective story told
by Siegel and Harris. The law, including contract law, tends to evolve in ways
that end up preserving and privileging established hierarchies, thereby perpetu-
ating existing unequal distributions of material and social goods. Siegel calls
this phenomenon “preservation through transformation.”169 Preservation
162 See supra text accompanying notes 148–52.
163 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 188.
164 Harris, supra note 110, at 1778; C.B. MACPHERSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC
JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 9 (1985); JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT
HISTORY 124 (1995).
165 See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 164, at 118–19, 124–25.
166 Harris, supra note 110, at 1778; MACPHERSON, supra note 164, at 9 (“Distributive jus-
tice require[s] that a society’s produce should be distributed in proportion to men’s merits.
But in a full-market society there is no measure of a man’s merit other than what the market
will award him . . . . So any actual distribution is by definition a distribution in proportion to
men’s merits, and hence just . . . .”).
167 See Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 628 (suggesting that if the underlying rules were
different, current reality could be very different too).
168 Cf. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 833
(1983) (explaining why abandoning myths is difficult).
169 Siegel, supra note 106, at 2119–20, 2184.
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through transformation, therefore, gives concrete form to Audre Lorde’s haunt-
ing maxim: “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”170 At
best, Lorde said, “They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game,
but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”171 And so it is
with contract law as well.
B. Some Thoughts on Law, Social Structures, and Agency
That law serves power seems to be a provable phenomenon. In and of
itself, this is an important insight, particularly in the context of contract law
where such things are not comfortably discussed. But two interesting questions
lurk in the background of this preservation through transformation analysis.
Specifically, why does this phenomenon happen at all, let alone happen so con-
sistently over time and across disciplines? And what explains Karl Llewellyn’s
role in all of this, given that his own convictions and commitments suggest that
he would not have consciously tried to increase the coercion present in contract
law?172 This essay will sketch out brief answers to these questions.
According to French social philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, conflict and com-
petition define social life.173 At stake in this contest is the power to determine
what will be deemed legitimate in the social world, where legitimacy means
deciding who and what has value and the amount of that value.174 Systems of
classification are thus produced that not only make up and order the social
world, but also constitute and order the people within it.175
The competition and struggle to define legitimacy take place in social
structures called fields.176 Fields are sites of contestation with boundaries that
extend only so far as the capital at stake within each field is given effect.177
170 Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER 110, 112 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 49, at 222, 244–46 (discussing the importance of good
faith to Llewellyn’s conception of Article 2); Wiseman, supra note 44, at 492 (arguing that
Llewellyn’s vision of Article 2 “also encompassed a normative belief that the law should
encourage the better practices and control the worst abuses of the market”); id. at 505 (argu-
ing that Llewellyn’s decision to carve out special rules applicable only to merchants “was
explicitly premised on the unfairness of imposing burdens and obligations on nonmerchant
buyers and sellers with different needs and . . . knowledge.”); accord Hillinger, supra note
54, at 1163; see also supra notes 76–103 (discussing coercion and contract law).
173 Patricia Thomson, Field, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS 67, 69 (Michael Grenfell
ed., 2008).
174 PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 169, 170 (1977) [hereinafter
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE]; Nick Crossley, Social Class, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS,
supra note 173, at 87, 96; Mustafa Emirbayer & Victoria Johnson, Bourdieu and Organiza-
tional Analysis, 37 THEORY & SOC’Y 1, 15 (2008).
175 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 164; J. Daniel Schubert, Suffering/Symbolic
Violence, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 183, 185.
176 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & LO¨IC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY 94–115 (1992); Moishe Postone et al., Introduction: Bourdieu and Social The-
ory, in BOURDIEU: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 1993); Thomson,
supra note 173, at 79.
177 BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 176, at 100; Thomson, supra note 173, at 71.
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Capital is broadly defined to mean “all forms of power,”178 and therefore
includes any and all resources that “become objects of struggle as valued
resources.”179 Typical kinds of capital include: economic (money and prop-
erty),180 cultural (which “covers a wide variety of resources, such as verbal
facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, scientific knowledge,
and educational credentials”),181 social (acquaintances, networks, family),182
and symbolic (“capital in any of its [other] forms insofar as it is accorded posi-
tive recognition, esteem, or honor by relevant actors within the field”).183 The
values and types of capital at stake differ from field to field.184
Regardless of the field, however, a cardinal principle applicable to every
field is that each actor has to buy into that field. Specifically, in order to partici-
pate in a given field, each actor tacitly agrees to the rules of the game,185
including the value given to the capital at stake in that field. This “buy-in” is
made possible because each actor who participates in a field shares unques-
tioned opinions and perceptions about the social world that are mediated by the
relatively autonomous fields in which she or he participates.186 These taken-
for-granted assumptions or orthodoxies not only determine what constitutes
“natural” practice within a field,187 they also condition and inform each actor’s
internalized sense of limits and aspirations.188 In short, these internalized self-
evident and unquestioned but tacitly accepted rules of the game in each field
determine to a large extent what can and cannot be done within that field and
by whom.  Equally as important, and specifically because of these self-evident
beliefs, the social world as represented in each field is perceived to be com-
pletely natural and not arbitrary.189 Consequently, actors within the field often
perceive it to be in their best interest “to act in ways that end up both lending
credence to, and reproducing,” the practices within that field.190
178 See BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 176, at 118–20; DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE
AND POWER 73 (1997); Postone et al., supra note 176, at 4.
179 SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 73–74.
180 Id. at 74; Thomson, supra note 173, at 69.
181 SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 43.
182 BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 176, at 119; SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 74;
Thomson, supra note 173, at 69.
183 Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
184 Ce´cile Deer, Doxa, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 119, 122
(“[S]ocial fields . . . have their own specific logic and necessity.”) [hereinafter Deer, Doxa];
Postone et al, supra note 176, at 5; Edward LiPuma, Culture and the Concept of Culture in a
Theory of Practice, in BOURDIEU: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 176, at 14, 16.
185 See BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 176, at 98–99; see also Deer, Doxa, supra
note 184, at 122; Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 11; Thomson, supra note 173, at
68–69.
186 Deer, Doxa, supra note 184, at 120. (These unstated, fundamental beliefs are what
Bourdieu calls “doxa.”). See generally BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 159–71.
187 Deer, Doxa, supra note 184, at 120.
188 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 164–66; Deer, Doxa, supra note 184, at 121;
Karl Maton, Habitus, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 49, 58.
189 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 164–66; Robert Moore, Capital, in PIERRE
BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 101, 104.
190 Schubert, supra note 175, at 185.
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Furthermore, all action taken by actors within a field is “interested.”191 In
capitalist societies, interest is generally associated with material forms of
accumulation.192 The pursuit of economic capital would be the primary exam-
ple. But according to Bourdieu, “interest” is much more broadly defined to
include “all . . . goods, material as [well as] symbolic, without distinction, that
present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after.”193 That said,
Bourdieu also takes the position that “practice never ceases to conform to eco-
nomic calculation, even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness by
departing from the logic of interested calculation . . . and playing for stakes that
are non-material and not easily quantified.”194 To say that all action is inter-
ested, therefore, means that every action an actor takes within a field is
designed to maximize his or her economic and symbolic profit.195 Signifi-
cantly, and specifically because “the game” taking place within each field is
always competitive, actors strive to maintain or improve their field position.196
While there are many different types of capital, economic capital is the
most efficient and powerful.197 Consequently, economic capital, particularly in
capitalist societies, is the most coveted.198 But economic capital is not distrib-
uted equally, since it is a product of accumulation and inheritance.199 This une-
qual distribution of economic capital results in the unequal accumulation of
other types of capital, as economic capital can and is easily convertible.200 For
example, economic capital enables an actor to obtain cultural capital in the
form of educational credentials. Formal education also results in the establish-
ment of acquaintances and networks, which is social capital.201 Agents, there-
fore, do not enter fields with the same kinds or amounts of capital.202
Because of this unequal accumulation of capital, there are two poles
within each field—the dominant and dominated poles.203 Dominant actors are
therefore the actors (i.e., individuals, groups, institutions, entities, corporations)
with the most capital of the right type(s) as defined by the field. Conversely,
191 SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 66.
192 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 176–77; SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 91; Moore,
supra note 189, at 101.
193 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 178.
194 Id. at 177.
195 Id. at 42, 183; Postone et al., supra note 176, at 5; Michael Grenfell, Interest, in PIERRE
BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 153, 154–55.
196 Patricia Thomson, Field, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 69;
Grenfell, supra note 195, at 154; LiPuma, supra note 184, at 16–17.
197 See Postone et al., supra note 176, at 5 (It is the most efficient and powerful because “it
alone [of the various types of capital] can be conveyed in the guise of general, anonymous,
all-purpose, convertible money from one generation to the next.”).
198 See SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 79; cf. BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 195.
199 Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1164 (2008).
200 Postone et al., supra note 176, at 5.
201 See Craig Calhoun, Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity,
in BOURDIEU: KEY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 176, at 61, 70.
202 Postone et al., supra note 176, at 5; Jewel, supra note 199, at 1164.
203 See Thomson, supra note 173, at 69–71; cf. Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 6.
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dominated actors are the people and entities with the least amount of the right
type of capital.204
But to reiterate, economic capital is the most powerful and determinant,
and as a result, it must be symbolically mediated,205 meaning it must be dis-
guised. It must be disguised because leaving the reproduction and accumulation
of economic capital undisguised “would reveal the arbitrary character of the
distribution of power and wealth” in society.206 Hence, the reproduction of
domination in modern capitalist and highly differentiated societies is largely
left to symbolism.207
Critical to Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction, therefore, is the idea that
interest (discussed above) is often misrecognized;208 that is, none of the actors
in the field recognize it as an action designed to maximize profit.209 This sug-
gests that even though action is always interested, the actor undertaking the
action may not be consciously aware that his action is interested.210 For exam-
ple, a person may want to become a scientist for the seemingly altruistic pur-
pose of finding a cure for AIDS. Becoming a scientist requires certain
educational credentials. Obtaining the educational credentials enables the actor
to accumulate social capital (i.e., networks formed with classmates and col-
leagues in various post-doctoral positions). And given that scientists are held in
high esteem in society, the actor also accumulates symbolic capital.211 All of
this symbolic profit (social and symbolic capital, together with any economic
capital associated with being a scientist) would result, even unknowingly, in
either a more secure or an improved field position (depending on the actor’s
original field position) for the newly minted scientist, his altruistic desire to
cure AIDS notwithstanding.
Significantly and as a result of misrecognition, the actor whose interested
action is misrecognized is able to accumulate symbolic capital,212 which to
Bourdieu “is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in society.”213
Symbolic capital, defined as “capital in any of its [other] forms insofar as it is
accorded positive recognition, esteem, or honor by relevant actors within the
field,”214 is simply a “disguised form of physical ‘economic’ capital.”215 As
such, it plays a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction not only
204 Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 6; Scott Lash, Pierre Bourdieu: Cultural
Economy and Social Change, in BOURDIEU: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 176, at 193,
201.
205 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 171–73, 176–77; see also Postone et al., supra
note 176, at 5; Moore, supra note 189, at 113.
206 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 171–73; Postone et al., supra note 176, at 5.
207 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 195; SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 90.
208 SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 89 (“[M]isrecognition denotes ‘denial’ of the economic and
political interests present in a set of practices.”).
209 Moore, supra note 189, at 104.
210 Grenfell, supra note 195, at 155.
211 See supra text accompanying note 183 (defining symbolic capital).
212 See generally BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 171–83; SWARTZ, supra note 178,
at 90; Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 12 (defining symbolic capital).
213 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 179, 183.
214 Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 12.
215 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 183.
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because it conceals its own economic origins,216 but also because all practice in
the social world conforms to economic calculation, even when it appears disin-
terested.217 Because accumulation of symbolic capital creates a certain distance
(i.e., time and resources) from necessity (the need to satisfy basic biological
requirements like food, shelter, etc.),218 actors within the dominant group are
most likely the ones who will be able to accumulate symbolic capital.219
Symbolic capital thus enables the misrecognized but nevertheless inter-
ested actions of the dominant actor to be legitimated, which means that the
misrecognized act or the thing produced by that action is given value by all the
actors in the field. One consequence of this process is that the dominant actor
has now acquired even more capital. More capital, of course, translates into a
better or at least a more secure field position within the dominant group. So,
this portion of the hierarchy is maintained.
Another important consequence of misrecognition, however, is that
because the dominant actor’s misrecognized action now has value, meaning
that it is now symbolic capital, it is something to be sought, emulated, or
adopted by the other actors within the field. And in seeking to acquire, adopt,
or emulate this symbolic capital, the dominated actor essentially reproduces the
hierarchy (dominant/dominated) that already exists in the field. The hierarchy
is reproduced by virtue of the fact that the dominated have implicitly (uncon-
sciously) ceded to the dominant actor (or group) the power to determine what is
legitimate in the social world. An example will help illustrate this point.
Harvard and Yale law schools account for nearly half of all professors in
the legal academy.220 The orthodoxy is that having a law degree of some kind
(i.e., J.D., LL.M., S.J.D.) from one of these two law schools will make getting a
job as a law professor much easier.221 A law degree from one of these two
schools, therefore, constitutes two types of capital: social (in the form of educa-
tional credentials) and symbolic because symbolic capital is simply capital in
any of its other forms including social capital, that “is accorded positive recog-
nition, esteem, or honor by relevant actors within the field.”222 It is in its role as
symbolic capital that the Harvard or Yale law degree enables the aspiring law
professor to get her foot in the door in the legal academic field. Some people in
this field will remain dominated because they simply lack the capital necessary
(economic, social, cultural) to acquire a law degree from either Harvard or
Yale. Other people, however, will be able to acquire such a degree. Perhaps not
as intuitively, if these people acquired their Harvard or Yale law degree simply
because of its value as symbolic capital, they, too, remain dominated. “Hierar-
chies and systems of domination are . . . reproduced to the extent that the domi-
216 Id.
217 Id. at 177.
218 Crossley, supra note 174, at 93.
219 Id. at 94.
220 See Brian R. Leiter, Where Current Law Faculty Went to Law School, BRIAN LEITER’S
L. SCH. RANKINGS, (Mar. 17, 2009) http://www.leiterrankings.com/jobs/2009job_teaching.
shtml.
221 See, e.g., What You Need to Know About Law Professorships, LAWCROSSING, http://
www.lawcrossing.com/article/4510/What-You-Need-to-Know-about-Law-Professorships/
(last visited Dec. 8, 2011).
222 Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 12.
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nant and the dominated perceive these systems to be legitimate, and thus think
and act in their own best interests within the context of the system itself.”223
Significantly, the symbolic capital can be and often is converted into eco-
nomic capital, which to reiterate, is the most powerful and determinant.224 In
fact, this is one of the aspects of symbolic capital that makes it so important in
Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction.225 In the example above, the Yale or
Harvard law degree (the symbolic capital) may very well be the ticket that
enables an actor to obtain the relatively high paying job (vis-a`-vis other profes-
sors in the academy) as a law professor.226 More economic capital plus the
symbolic capital associated with being a law professor translates into either a
more secure or improved field position, and, as a direct result, the professor’s
voice is given more weight in determining the legitimacy of the social world
specifically because of her position.
Together, interest, misrecognition, symbolic capital, and legitimation cre-
ate what Bourdieu calls “symbolic violence.”227 Symbolic violence, which
Bourdieu understands “as the capacity to impose the means for comprehending
and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power
in disguised, taken-for-granted forms,”228  results when actors misrecognize as
natural the hierarchies and systems of domination produced through the strug-
gle within fields to determine legitimacy,229 and agree to play by the rules of
the game as laid out for them.230 Symbolic violence is an effective and efficient
form of domination because the dominant group and the various actors within it
“have only to let the system they dominate take its own course in order to
exercise their domination.”231 Schematically, Bourdieu’s theory of domination
might look something like this:
223 Schubert, supra note 175, at 184.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 200–02.
225 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 179, 183; see also SWARTZ, supra note 178, at
92; Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction, to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 812 (Richard Terdiman
trans., 1987) [hereinafter Bourdieu, Force].
226 See e.g., 2009-10 CUPA-HR National Faculty Salary Survey, C. & UNIV. PROF. ASS’N
FOR HUM. RESOURCES, http://www.cupahr.org/surveys/nfss_surveydata10.asp (last visited
Dec. 8, 2011).
227 See generally BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 183–97; see also BOURDIEU &
WACQUANT, supra note 176, at 167–68.
228 SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 89.
229 Moore, supra note 189, at 104.
230 Schubert, supra note 175, at 185; Jewel, supra note 199, at 1162–63.
231 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 190 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 184;
Schubert, supra note 175, at 184.
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Symbolic violence thus replaces physical coercion as the means by which
the dominant continue to dominate. And the dominated become complicit in
their own domination, because collective misrecognition, which is essentially a
“collective denial of the economic reality of exchange,”232 “is only possible . . .
when the group lies to itself in this way” and everyone believes those lies.233
Change within a field, such as changing established values or assessments
of capital, is certainly possible. Crises (like the Cold War)234 and the develop-
ment of new technologies (like the digital and bio-technology revolutions)235
can force changes in a field.236 Change is also possible, however, because of
the way fields are constructed. Since fields are sites of perpetual struggle, there
will never be an ultimate winner because the “game” that is the struggle taking
place in a given field will be unending.237 This means that changing
demographics may lead to changes in individual strategies within a field,
which, in turn, could also change values within a given field.238
In the specific context of the field of law, which Bourdieu calls the “juridi-
cal field,”239 the struggle is over the right to determine the law and for control
of access to legal resources.240 The dominant actors in this field are the lawyers
and judges (still mostly white men)241 because they possess the right kinds of
232 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 196; Moore, supra note 189, at 104.
233 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 196.
234 See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (2002).
235 Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 16–17.
236 BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 169.
237 Thomson, supra note 173, at 79.
238 Id.; Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 18–21.
239 Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction, in Bourdieu, Force, supra note 225, at 805–06.
240 Bourdieu, Force, supra note 225, at 817.
241 See Lawyer Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/Pub-
licDocuments/Lawyer_Demographics.pdf-2009-12-15 (last visited Dec. 8, 2011) (i.e., Amer-
ican Bar Association demographic chart shows, for example, the following statistics: 1980:
92% men; 1991: 80% men; 2000: 73% men; 1990: 92.6% white; in 2000: 88.8% white).
Fall 2011] CROSS PURPOSES & UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 79
capital—namely, cultural and symbolic (in the form of educational credentials,
training, and knowledge of legal processes and texts), social (networks), and
economic. The dominated actors are clients242 because they lack the right kinds
of capital, particularly cultural capital.
All of the actors within the field tacitly accept “the field’s fundamental
law . . . which requires that, within the field, conflicts can only be resolved
juridically—that is, according to the rules and conventions of the field
itself.”243 Actors thus assume without question, and therefore misrecognize,
that the law is neutral, apolitical, and objective.244 They also mistakenly
believe that conflicts between people can be converted into clearly defined
legal claims245 that can then be decided by independent and objective third-
party professional proxies (specifically by the parties’ lawyers and the judge)
who know and understand the law because of their education and training,246
and hence can properly and correctly resolve the disputes to achieve justice
under the law.247 Actors also agree to accept “the rules of legislation, regula-
tion, and judicial precedent by which legal decisions are ostensibly struc-
tured”248 as part of the rules of the game. As a result, case outcomes or
“solutions are accepted as impartial because they have been defined according
to the formal and logically coherent rules of a doctrine perceived as indepen-
dent of the immediate antagonisms.”249
Because the objectivity, neutrality, and universality of the law and its
processes are taken for granted and assumed, all the actors misrecognize that
the legal field is actually set up to serve the dominant group’s interests. For
instance, actors in the dominant group share a closeness of interest resulting
from their similar holdings of social (family) and cultural (educational back-
grounds) capital.250 This identity of background and interest fosters similar dis-
positions251 and kindred world-views. As a result, “the choices which those in
242 The exception is clients who have a lot of economic capital. In this circumstance, the
client is the dominant actor, and the lawyer is dominated. The reason for this role reversal is
because economic capital is the most powerful kind of capital in every field. See supra text
accompanying notes 197–206 (discussing importance of economic capital). Hence, it is not
hard to imagine that there are numerous subfields within the legal field where the client is
the dominant actor. The exception may therefore be bigger than the rule stated in the text.
But in the subfield of law dealing with identity politics, specifically, claims based on race,
gender, class, etc., chances are the client will not be a powerful economic actor and will
therefore be the dominated actor.
243 Bourdieu, Force, supra note 225, at 831.
244 Id. at 813.
245 Id. at 833.
246 Id. at 834, 844.
247 Id. at 818.
248 Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction in id. at 807.
249 Id. at 830.
250 Id. at 842.
251 An actor’s dispositions are the product of what Bourdieu calls habitus. See, e.g.,
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 174, at 78–87. There is no easy and straightforward way to
explain or describe habitus. That said, Karl Malton describes it thus: “habitus focuses on our
ways of acting, feeling, thinking, and being. It captures how we carry within us our history
. . . and how we then make choices to act in certain ways and not others.” Karl Malton,
Habitus, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 49, 52; see also SWARTZ,
supra note 178, at 100–01.
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the legal realm must constantly make between differing or antagonistic inter-
ests, values, and world-views are unlikely to disadvantage the dominant
forces.”252
The problem, of course, is that the field of law also adheres to precedent.
This adherence to precedent ties the present to the past and “guarantee[s] that
. . . the future will resemble what has gone before, that necessary transforma-
tions and adaptations will be conceived and expressed in a language that con-
forms to the past.”253 The language and the world views expressed in legal
precedents protect and continue to protect the dominant group’s interests.
Hence, despite the changes wrought in the law based on evolving demographics
and the identity politics surrounding race, gender, and class,254 the law going
forward was and is unlikely to upset the hierarchy by disadvantaging the domi-
nant group’s interests.
This is obviously an overly simplified explanation of the intricacies of
how the legal field works.255 But it should suffice to make the basic point that
symbolic violence is perpetrated on all the actors in the field of law because the
actors—clients, lawyers, judges—end up misrecognizing as natural the hierar-
chies and systems of domination produced within that field256 and agree to play
by the rules of the game as laid out for them. And because they tacitly agree to
play by rules of the game, the arbitrariness present in the taken-for-granted and
self-evident assumptions in the field of law remain concealed. As a result, the
hierarchies (men over women, rich men over poor men, and white men over
Black men) get reproduced consistently, over time and across disciplines.257
As for Llewellyn, his capital holdings (economic, cultural, social, and
symbolic)258 would have ensconced him firmly within the dominant group in
the legal field. He therefore would have possessed, consciously and subcon-
sciously, similar predispositions and world-views with other members of the
dominant group.259 And because Llewellyn was also an actor in the legal field,
he, too, would have internalized the rules of the game and tacitly agreed to play
by them. All of these things—his position as a dominant actor, his predisposi-
tion and world view, and the orthodoxies of the field—make certain things,
such as disturbing the status quo, difficult, if not unthinkable. Hence, none of
the changes Llewellyn implemented disturbed the status quo.260
It therefore seems fairly safe to say that elites, like Llewellyn, do not nec-
essarily conspire to maintain their dominant position in society. Instead, Llew-
252 Bourdieu, Force, supra note 225, at 842.
253 Id. at 845.
254 See supra Part III.A.
255 See generally Bourdieu, Force, supra note 225.
256 Moore, supra note 189, at 104.
257 See supra Part III.A.
258 Llewellyn was a graduate of Yale Law School and taught at some of the most prestigi-
ous law schools in the country. His cultural capital (i.e., his credentials, experience, etc.)
enabled him to become, among other things, the primary architect of the U.C.C. See gener-
ally TWINING, supra note 13, at 87–113, 367; Mooney, supra note 49, at 223; Wiseman,
supra note 44, at 467.
259 See supra text accompanying note 242 (discussing the identity of background and inter-
est by the dominant group).
260 See supra text accompanying notes 44–61.
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ellyn, his predecessors in the legal field, and his contemporaries, were probably
acting in good faith.261 But even if true, good faith does not absolve Llewel-
lyn—or any of us, for that matter—for our roles in perpetuating the reproduc-
tion of hierarchies and domination or the inequality that is part and parcel of
them.262 It goes without saying, however, that while we may all be complicit,
we do not all share equally in the adverse consequences that result from this
collective complicity.
CONCLUSION—USING THE MASTER’S TOOLS
One thing is clear from the foregoing discussion. Audre Lorde is correct:
We cannot dismantle the master’s house using the master’s tools263 because all
tools are the master’s tools, and as a result, they all end up serving the
master.264
Audre Lorde may be correct, but if all tools are the master’s tools, what is
left to work with? The social world (reality) with its hierarchies, its domination,
and its ever present adverse material consequences, remains and must be con-
fronted. Law is one of the master’s tools, one that has proven to be a double-
edged sword. It both changes and reifies.265 But if the only choice is to use one
of the master’s tools or no tool at all, it seems clear that the tool must be used.
The final question, then, is to decide how best to move forward. An impor-
tant ongoing step is to be continually aware of the arbitrary ways in which the
social world is constructed and to expose that arbitrariness.266 Public exposure
may destroy the legitimacy of embedded interests, or at least help in that
endeavor, thereby creating the space to first consider other possibilities and
then, ultimately, to alter existing social arrangements.267 This is not a new
approach. The Crits (including the Legal Realists) have been doing this for a
very long time,268 which is not surprising, given the way domination is repro-
261 Siegel, supra note 106, at 2180.
262 Id. at 2181–83.
263 LORDE, supra note 170, at 110.
264 See supra Part III.B.
265 See supra Part III.A.
266 PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE & SYMBOLIC POWER 1, 170 n.8 (John B. Thompson ed.,
Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Harvard University Press 1991); Schubert,
supra note 175, at 196.
267 SWARTZ, supra note 178, at 10; Harris, supra note 110, at 1715.
268 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 13–46 (the Legal Realists); see also SIMONE
DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 726–27 (Constance Borde & Sheila Malovany-Chevallier
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2009) (1949) (Feminism); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237–39, 241–42 (1989) (Feminism); Crenshaw, supra note
105, at 1382 (Critical Race Theory); Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, White By Law, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 542, 543–47 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (Critical Race The-
ory); Harris, supra note 110, at 1715 (Critical Race Theory); Joseph William Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 63 (1984) (Critical Legal
Studies); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 586–87 (1983) (Critical Legal Studies); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orienta-
tion” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1995) (Queer Legal
Theory).
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duced in society.269 Notwithstanding the daunting nature of this task, it must
continue. To gain traction, however, this effort cannot be carried out individu-
ally.270 It must be a collective effort, organized by and around race, gender,
class, sexual orientation, etc., and in which strategies of action by actors in one
field are shared with similarly situated actors in other fields.271 At stake in this
struggle, of course, is the power to determine what will be deemed legitimate in
the social world. As such, this is a struggle worth undertaking.
269 See supra Part III.B.
270 Cecile Deer, Reflexivity, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 173, at 199,
202.
271 Id.; see Emirbayer & Johnson, supra note 174, at 20–21; Thomson, supra note 173, at
68.
